Thursday, March 31, 2011

BAN CALLS FOR GENUINE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN MYANMAR


BAN CALLS FOR GENUINE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN MYANMAR
New York, Mar 30 2011  4:05PM

Myanmar’s authorities have a duty to show that their announced transfer of power from the long-ruling State Peace and Development Council to a new Government is more than a change in name and a genuine move away from military rule, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said today.

“Responding to the long-standing aspirations of the Myanmar people for national reconciliation, democratization and respect for human rights remains essential to laying the foundations for durable peace and development in the country,” he <"http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=5175">said in a statement issued by his spokesperson.

“The Myanmar authorities now have an opportunity and, indeed, an obligation to their people, to demonstrate that this change is one of substance and that it is the start of a genuine move away from almost 50 years of direct military rule,” he added.

Mr. Ban called on the authorities to engage in an inclusive dialogue “with all relevant parties on broad reforms necessary for the development of a credible system of government that can effectively address the political and socio-economic challenges facing Myanmar.”

He pledged the UN’s continued commitment to work with all relevant actors toward building a “stable and fully democratic future in which all the people of Myanmar can contribute.”

Last month Mr. Ban took note of the newly-convened Parliament’s election of a new president and vice-presidents and voiced hope that the move marked the beginning of a change from the status quo.

Mr. Ban has long been involved in seeking to ease the South-East Asian country’s transition to democracy. At the time of elections last year, he warned that the vote was unsatisfactory because of the exclusion of some parties, including that of Nobel Peace Prize laureate and pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

Her National League for Democracy (NLD) won the last elections, later invalidated by the country’s rulers, two decades ago but was barred from participating this time. For much of the past 20 years she was held under house arrest before being released in November last year. At that time Mr. Ban called for the release of all remaining political prisoners and highlighted the need to include in the transition al those who were excluded from the elections.


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For more details go to UN News Centre at http://www.un.org/news

Friday, March 18, 2011

Publication: Karen "Nowhere to Be Home" Compiled by Maggie Lemere and Zoe West



AVAILABLE NOW FROM VOICE OF WITNESS
NOWHERE TO BE HOME: NARRATIVES FROM SURVIVORS OF BURMA’S MILITARY REGIME



 
Edited by Maggie Lemere and Zoë West



This month, McSweeney’s Voice of Witness releases Nowhere to be Home: Narratives from Survivors of Burma’s Military Regime, edited by Maggie Lemere and Zoë West. Nowhere to be Home is a collection of oral histories exposing the realities of life under military rule. In their own words, men and women from Burma describe their lives in the country that Human Rights Watch has called “the textbook example of a police state.” The book is the seventh title in the Voice of Witness series and is now available in the United States.
The following are excerpts from three of the oral histories in the collection.

Saw Moe

Saw Moe met us for interviews in the evenings, after closing up his bookshop in Thailand. He methodically described his time in Burma’s army, giving matter-of-fact descriptions of battle after battle, and eventually the event that forced him into exile. Saw Moe works part-time as a trainer for the Karen National Liberation Army, one of the armed opposition groups he spent much of his career fighting.
My parents are Karen, but I cannot speak the language because I grew up in a community of mostly Burman people in Rangoon, which is far away from Karen State. When I enrolled in school I had to say I was Burman— if I said I was Karen, people would discriminate against me. There were around sixty students in my class, and more than fifty of those students were Burman, so there were very few ethnic students. I couldn’t use “Saw” at the beginning of my name because that is what Karen people use, so I used a Burman name instead. But the students knew I was Karen anyway, so I was called “rodent Karen” and “smelly Karen.” That’s what they called all the Karen students.
When I joined the military, I still could not say I was Karen because I felt like I would not be promoted if they knew I was Karen. The Burmese military is dominated by the Burman ethnic group, and other ethnicities usually cannot advance in the military.
I joined the military voluntarily when I was seventeen. I joined because I liked fighting. As a young man, I wanted to be in battle, going from place to place. I planned to be a brigadier general or a colonel. It was 1979 or ’80 when I joined. My family didn’t like that I was in the army because they were afraid I would die in battle.
When I joined the army, the training course was six months long. In our course, there were about two hundred and fifty trainees. We had to train to have strong bodies first, so we could defend ourselves. For example, we had to run many miles each day. We had to learn how to shoot guns—we had to learn the “one enemy one bullet” system. When we practiced shooting targets, we had to search on the ground for every bullet that had missed the target. If you were missing even one bullet, you were not allowed to have lunch. If we made mistakes, the trainers beat us. We had to learn to follow all commands in order to avoid the beatings.
As soldiers, we were automatically members of the Burma Socialist Programme Party—the party of the former military regime—so we had to learn about party policies. During that time, the enemies we had to fight were the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the Shan State Army (SSA), the Communist Party of Burma (CPB)’s army, and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The CPB was our main enemy.
We had to learn about our enemies’ backgrounds and histories, how they started, what their aims were, and what type of fighting force they were—their artillery, their mines, and defense strategies. We were also trained in psychological warfare—propaganda. We had regular training until six o’clock, and then we had the psychological warfare training. There were two main things that they trained us to do: one was to believe in the propaganda, in the policies of the socialist party, and the other was to follow orders. You could not ask any questions, you could only listen. They trained us very well. The military trains soldiers how to do psychological warfare campaigns—how to persuade someone who dislikes you to like you, and how to make things unclear. For example, if we did bad things in a certain area, we would make the people believe that we didn’t do those things—that was part of the army’s strategy in areas where we were active. It was important for us to understand how to make other people or groups look bad too. We had a very rational way of lying to the people for our benefit. We would be very friendly with some people and show them a lot of things they could believe, while we had a hidden purpose.
We had to train and study very hard, but we had enough food and we were all learning together. All the trainees had the same spirit and we were all very happy, because we had chosen to join the army. Now it’s different—now the army has to force young people to join. Leading up to 1988, fewer and fewer soldiers were joining the army. Then after the ’88 uprising, we started forcing young people to join the Burmese army because they didn’t wish to join anymore—they hated the army.

Philip

We interviewed Philip on the front porch of his home in Loi Tai Leng, headquarters of the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), as the rain pounded down on the roof and engulfed the verdant mountains surrounding us.1 Philip is a soldier and foreign relations officer in the SSA-S, one of the ethnic armies still in active opposition to the State Peace and Development Council. Philip spent eighteen years living as a monk, but was unsatisfied with his capacity to work for an independent Shan State. The fighting between the SPDC and the armed opposition groups creates dangerous and unstable conditions for villagers living in areas where there are conflicts with non-state armed groups. As part of the war against opposition groups in Burma, the SPDC uses the notorious four-cuts counterinsurgency strategy, which aims to weaken the opposition armies by cutting off their supplies of food, funding recruits, and information. They do this by forcibly relocating local populations, burning down houses and entire villages, detaining, torturing, and/or killing those suspected of having contact with opposition armies, and stealing or extorting food, crops, money, and livestock from villagers.2
According to estimates from the exile news organization Mizzima, there are twenty-four armed ethnic groups in Burma—nineteen have signed ceasefire agreements with the regime, while five remain in active opposition. Many of the ceasefires remain tenuous. Altogether, tens of thousands of armed opposition soldiers remain under arms.
The summer I was twelve, I came back to the village at five o’clock in the evening after taking care of my neighbor’s buffaloes and cows, and I saw fire and smoke. I heard shooting noises and people screaming; the village was overwhelmed with the smell and crackling sound of burning houses. I had no idea what to think. Whenever and wherever there was fighting between the Shan rebel soldiers and the Burmese soldiers, the villages would be burned. But usually when the Burmese government military burned villages, we had time to escape with a bag of clothes.
This time, the Burmese soldiers had burned down the whole village. Most of the people had gone into hiding for their safety. My family members were working on the farm, and when we went back to the village and saw that it had been burned, we ran into the jungle for safety just like the others. We had to keep moving from place to place through the jungle, until we reached a place were we could establish a new village.
My parents were really sad that we were not treated like human beings. This event had a big impact in my life—it made me care about human rights and want to fight for justice where there is injustice. Three different villages I lived in were burned down, and my family had to run all three times. Most of the time, we would run straight to the jungle and then move to another village. The Burmese soldiers wouldn’t tolerate a new village being set up in the same place.
I am a soldier in the Shan State Army because I want to work for my country, and because independence is the best way forward for the Shan people. English speakers call me Philip, but my Shan name is Yawd Muang. I don’t fight for myself, or for my family—I fight for my homeland. I have been a soldier in the Shan State Army for ten years. Before that, I was a monk for eighteen years.
When people talk about Burma, normally they only talk about two things: first, democracy and Aung San Suu Kyi; and second, about the drugs and the Golden Triangle.4 For international people to truly understand what the deep problems in Burma are, they have to come here and observe. In Shan State, everyone knows that Burmese soldiers go to the villages and commit human rights abuses. They take everything, rape girls and torture people. When the SPDC kills people, it’s like they’re killing mosquitoes. They don’t care, they just want to keep their power.
Mahatma Gandhi fought the British by protesting only with his hands—no weapons, nothing. He went into the streets and boycotted everything, with millions of people in India supporting the fight for independence, until the British left. But if you oppose the SPDC, you need to have a gun to protect yourself and protect your country. If not, they’ll kill you. If they catch a monk with a flower in his hand saying “Please forgive me, please don’t kill me!” they don’t care—they will kill you. They have even tried to kill people like Aung San Suu Kyi, because she’s very popular and the leader of democracy. They have guns; they have power.

Hla Min 

Taken off the streets at nine years old and forced to become a child soldier, Hla Min was fighting on the front line in Karen State by age fourteen. He traveled for an entire day to meet us in Cox’s Bazar, a coastal city home to many Burmese refugees in Bangladesh—the country to which he fled in 2007 after the Saffron Revolution.
He told us his story until 1 a.m. that night, knowing it would be our only opportunity to meet before he returned to work on a tobacco farm the next day. Hla Min is one former child soldier in a country frequently cited for having the most child soldiers in the world.2 Analysts have pointed out that the Tatmadaw’s ongoing forced conscription of minors is one of the crucial factors allowing the military to increase its size and therefore its strength.
I’d like to tell you the story of how I joined the army as a child. I was nine years old, and I was living in the Hlaingthaya Township in Rangoon Division. It was a school holiday on the full moon day in November, and we were making a picnic. At around 8 p.m., one of my friends and I went out to buy some chicken. At that moment, an army truck came and took us. When they pulled us into the back of the truck, I found there were six or seven soldiers inside. My friend and I thought they were killers and I was worried. They made us lie down on the floor—there were no seats—and when I tried to shout, they covered my mouth with their hands. They said, “You keep quiet, you have to come with us.”
My friend and I were afraid but we didn’t say anything to each other. I had heard from my parents that soldiers beat and arrested people in my village. I’d also heard that soldiers shot people in the street, so I was afraid that they might kill me. The drive felt very long and I had no chance to run away. When the truck stopped, we got out and I saw the army base. My friend and I had been brought to a Burmese army battalion in Rangoon Division.
When we arrived at the army base, my friend and I were brought to separate cells. They were like prison cells, and they chained the doors shut.
My friend and I were very lonely while living at the army base. When we first arrived, we were not allowed to talk to each other. We were confined to separate rooms and we weren’t allowed to play together. After working all day, finishing dinner, and washing the dishes, we were locked up in the rooms again. Sometimes they scolded and beat me when I dropped a bucket of water, or a plate or bowl. During those times, I missed my home very much. I cried for my mother and for my family. I was the youngest of five, and I would play with my brothers and sisters and go to school with them. My parents really loved me and they always made me happy. Sometimes when I cried, I was beaten by the cooks and by the sergeants. Sometimes they slapped me and sometimes they beat me with a stick. While they were beating me they would say, “Why are you crying? Stop your crying!”
After about two months at the army base, I was sent to a recruitment center. I think it was called the Mingaladon Recruitment Center. When I first arrived, I found almost seventy children there who were around my age.
Sometimes the soldiers let me play with the other children, and sometimes they asked me to fight with other children. The leaders would come to us and tell us to wrestle, so we had to fight with each other until one of us fell down—the person left standing won. Sometimes I won, but sometimes I lost. I tried to beat the others and when I won, I was happy because I was given snacks. If someone won, they’d give a snack to them or buy them clothes. Sometimes the army soldiers and officers told me, “When you grow up, you will have to hold a gun like me.” When soldiers told us that, we felt really pleased.
I was around fourteen years old when I was ordered to go to the front line. My officer told me, “You have to go and fight the guerillas in Karen State.” During my training, and then at our battalion meetings, the leaders always preached about how cruel the rebels were, so at the time I believed the guerillas were trying to take my country and kill my people. We were asked to search for the guerillas and fight them.
One day, while I was carrying the unit’s cooking pot, I heard a blast behind me and I fell down, unconscious. When I woke up, I thought I had lost my legs, but it wasn’t a landmine, it was a remote-controlled bomb that had detonated. It had hit my backside and my head—the shrapnel had injured my right ear and cheek, my back, chest, and arms, but the pot had helped to protect me.
It took me about a month to recover. After I was better, I was sent back to my army battalion and then on to the front line again. While we were on the front line, our officers ordered us to completely destroy the local people. They told us that even the children had to be killed if we saw them. I saw soldiers abducting young girls, dragging them from their houses and raping them. At the time, I felt that those girls were like my sisters.
When I was in the army, I thought the guerillas were trying to break my country, to destroy my country—this is how I used to think. Not now, now I’m not the same. I don’t know why people join the military. As for myself, I was forced to be a soldier. If I had stayed with my family, I would not have been a soldier. I think the army takes children because they need to strengthen their forces, increase the number of soldiers. I think there is a reward for each soldier who catches a child. Any time a soldier recruits someone to join the force, they get a lot of money. Older soldiers told me that if they recruit someone, then they can quit the army.
Voice of Witness main website
To purchase Nowhere to be Home 
A calendar of readings and speaking engagements for this book 
Recommended Citation:
Maggie Lemere and Zoe West, "Nowhere to be Home" (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, March 17, 2011)

With thanks to:
http://www.fpif.org/articles/nowhere_to_be_home

Thursday, March 3, 2011

KNU Statement on Baseless Accusation by SPDC and Call for Nationwide Ceasefire


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KNU Statement on Baseless Accusation by SPDC and Call for Nationwide Ceasefire

24 Feb 2011

We, the Karen National Union (KNU), reject totally the baseless accusation by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the military dictatorship of Burma, that the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) troops fired heavy weapons at a lemon farm owned by U Zaw Lay Htoo in Shwegyin Township, Bago Division, at about 9 am on 17 February, leaving four farm workers dead and three wounded.
The SPDC further asserted that the KNU was undermining the peace of the State, and committing destructive acts causing death and injury. The world knows well that it is the SPDC policy to allow its troops to shoot and kill innocent civilians, burn villages and farms, torture suspects, commit rape of women etc. in all the KNU areas. In urban areas, the SPDC imprisons people asking for human rights and freedom, sells narcotic drugs freely and deliberately to impoverish the population.
The latest accusation is just a smoke screen for the military dictatorship to build up an offensive against the KNU and the KNLA, which is the armed wing of the KNU. Our troops have few heavy weapons and unlike the SPDC, they never deliberately fire on civilian targets.
To help solve Burma’s problems, we have repeatedly urged the Burmese regime to respond to calls by the United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Security Council, European Union, United States of America and others, to engage in genuine tripartite dialogue with the opposition forces, for positive change. However, the regime refuses and instead continues to target our civilian populations for military attack.
We, the KNU together with the other ethnic nationality forces, are ready for dialogue in order to resolve Burma’s political problems through political means. We call upon the international community, and peace and justice loving countries around the world to support actively the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to secure a nationwide ceasefire, leading to meaningful and inclusive dialogue to achieve national reconciliation and a return to democracy and normalcy in our country.
Supreme Headquarters
Karen National Union

http://www.karennationalunion.net/index.php 

Asian Human Rights Commission comments on Myanmar's Universal Periodic Review (UPR)

UN: Myanmar and the Human Rights Council review
Thursday, 3 March 2011, 9:48 am

Press Release: Asian Human Rights Commission

Myanmar: The problem of a U.N. member state disconnected from a normative framework: Myanmar and the Human Rights Council review

1. In a separate submission to this session of the Human Rights Council, the Asian Legal Resource Centre has analyzed how the Government of Myanmar recently treated the Universal Periodic Review process not as an opportunity for dialogue of the sort that the process envisages but as an opportunity to present an almost entirely fictionalized account of human rights conditions in its country. The ALRC explained that the reason for the government delegation's gross misrepresentations is not so much the consequence of a strategy to thwart the UPR process in Geneva, as it is the consequence of the disconnection of the government from any type of normative framework for the protection of human rights, international or domestic alike. Whereas the UPR process is premised upon the existence of a domestic framework for the implementation of normative international standards on human rights, in Myanmar, no such normative basis for the protection of rights exists. On the contrary, the Government of Myanmar's conceptualization of rights is that these are entitlements that can be extended or withdrawn according to circumstances. Consequently, gross misrepresentation of the human rights situation in the country is not so much strategy as it is inevitability.
2. In this submission, the ALRC considers the implications of this disconnect between the norms-based language and activities of the global human rights movement and the norm-less reality of a member state. This disconnect is not merely a disconnect between rhetorical aspirations and hard truth. It is a much more significant problem of the gap between a norms-based system and a norm-less one, and unless it is properly understood and accounted for in the work of the Human Rights Council and other international agencies, the many functional and technical proposals being put forward during the ongoing Council review process will have little if any relevance to the situation of human rights in Myanmar, or other countries with analogous conditions.
3. The problem of the gap between a norms-based international system and a norm-less domestic one is a difficult problem to approach and understand for people who have been trained in and are accustomed to norms-based systems, which is perhaps one of the reasons that it attracts relatively little of the debate about the work of the Council. However, the problem is often implicit in questions and exchanges about human rights issues in member states, such as those raised in the lead up to the UPR Working Group's tenth session, this January 2011. Two of the Government of Japan's questions to Myanmar were particularly interesting because of their implicit acknowledgement that the problem of systemic rights abuse in Myanmar is less a problem of refusal to engage with the standards of the international community, less a problem of engagement with international law, than it is a problem of engagement with domestic law, or rather, with any standards of law whatsoever. These questions ran:
"Although the Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar provides for the right of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, concerns over restrictions on such freedoms continue to be expressed in UN reports and resolutions. Likewise, the continued practice of arbitrary detention and torture, while prohibited by the Penal Code, has been raised as a matter of concern. We would like to request that the Myanmar Government explain how its understanding of the provisions laid out in its Constitution and Penal Code relates to the concerns and issues pointed out by the UN…
"What are the prospects for Myanmar becoming a signatory to the international conventions on human rights that it is currently examining, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights (ICESCR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the rights of the Child on the sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography? In this connection, we would also like to inquire as to why the Convention Against Torture and the Optional Protocol on the Convention on the rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict are not also under examination for signature by Myanmar."
4. While it is not correct to say that the constitution and Penal Code protect people in Myanmar from abuses of the sort mentioned by Japan, the first question is essentially correct in that it raises the basic problem of the government's routine failure to comply with its own domestic law. This is not merely a practical problem of the gap between what is on paper and what goes on in real life of the sort found to one degree or another in all jurisdictions. It is, rather, a consequence of the imperative for all institutions in Myanmar to follow instructions on the implementation of policy, irrespective of law. It is a consequence of the disengagement of the state in Myanmar with any firm concept of law, properly understood as the product of a legislature, for over two decades. The gap between domestic law and reality in Myanmar is not a simple consequence of practices that engender rights abuses; it is a matter of policy. This is a primary cause of chronic rights abuse in Myanmar, yet it is one that has not yet been properly or fully acknowledged by the Human Rights Council.
5. Where a state is as a matter of policy disengaged from any meaningful concept of law nationally, it can hardly be expected to engage with international law. Thus, as Japan indicates in the second paragraph, there is a vast gap between the development of human rights standards internationally and the recognition of these by the government of Myanmar. Decades after the rest of the world passed core covenants of the international bill of rights, Myanmar still has not joined them; and, while more and more countries in Asia join the Convention against Torture and introduce domestic legislation of varying quality to prohibit its use, Myanmar still has not seemingly even recognized the convention's existence. But the important point in coming to terms with this second type of engagement is the linkage with the first, since even where a state pretends to engage with law internationally, if it is not doing the same domestically then any such apparent engagement will have few or no practical consequences.
6. This incapacity to engage with basic norms for the protection of human rights at either an international or domestic level is manifest in the 70 recommendations "that do not enjoy the support of Myanmar" listed in the UPR Working Group's draft report on Myanmar (A/HRC/WG.6/10/L.7, 2 February 2011, paragraph 107). While rather awkwardly insisting that it is in compliance with international standards, the government rejected recommendations that included, among many others, the following:
a. "Amend the Constitution… in compliance with international human rights treaties and humanitarian laws (Denmark)";
b. "Begin a transparent and inclusive dialogue with all national stakeholders… aimed at reviewing and reforming all relevant national legislation to ensure that it is consistent with international human rights law (Maldives)";
c. "Repeal laws that are not in compliance with international human rights law and review its legal system to ensure compliance with the rights to… a fair trial and respect for the rule of law (New Zealand)";
d. "Cooperate with the international human rights mechanisms and humanitarian agencies, specifically by issuing a standing invitation to the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council and allowing full and unhindered access to all persons in need of humanitarian assistance (Republic of Korea)";
e. "Take appropriate measures to end de-facto and de-jure discrimination with all minority groups (Pakistan)";
f. "Investigate and punish all cases of intimidation, harassment, persecution, torture and forced disappearances, especially against political dissidents, journalists, ethnic and religious minorities and human rights defenders (Uruguay)"; and,
g. "Seek technical assistance from United Nations to reform judiciary, to establish accessible judicial remedies as well as to alleviate poverty (Turkey)".
7. It would be difficult to understand why any government with a commitment to international standards would not in principle at least agree with any of the above non-specific recommendations. However, when a government has disengaged from human rights norms both in international and domestic law not only is it understandable that such recommendations would be rejected, but it is also imperative that they be rejected. For a government divorced from any normative framework for human rights, arbitrary, inconsistent and contradictory positions on human rights standards are both necessary and unavoidable. In the absence of adherence to any consistent set of standards, whether at home or abroad, there is no body of principles against which decisions can be made and policies applied. Decision-making is relativised and situation-specific; recommendations are accepted or rejected according to expediency.
8. The problem of what the U.N. can do with a member state that is disconnected from any normative framework for the protection of human rights urgently needs to be taken up in the ongoing Human Rights Council review process (in accordance with General Assembly resolution 60/251, 15 March 2006).
9. There have been some initiatives in the lead up to the review; however, many of the issues raised, such as at the Algiers retreat in February 2010, are technical in nature or concerned mainly with the inevitable politicization of the Council processes, rather than the more difficult problem of a member state operating according to an entirely different conceptualization of human rights than that on which the work of the international human rights system is premised, and one disconnected from any standards for the application of human rights not only at the international but also at the domestic level. Consequently, challenges facing the Council, such as the apparent ineffectiveness of special sessions, are discussed mainly in superficial terms, with reference to specific difficulties associated with specific identifiable outcomes, and without critical examination of possible underlying reasons for failure.
10. The problem that a norm-less state in a normative framework presents is also in part due to the confusion caused by apparently common language that disguises fundamental differences in conceptions, which are revealed only through careful study of circumstances and rhetoric. Although the discussions around the review acknowledge the importance of dialogue, they implicitly take any exchange of views to be a form of dialogue. They also presuppose that member states in the UPR process will in fact engage in frank discussion of their human rights problems and challenges. They fail to recognize and grapple with the problem of what happens when a member state, while apparently talking in the same language as the international community, in fact holds or expresses views that are profoundly contradictory to the values and human rights goals of the latter.
11. The most important problem for the Human Rights Council regarding Myanmar is not a functional problem, but a problem of understanding. The Council review process presents an opportunity for the Council to go into more significant conceptual and epistemological questions about how to engage with a member state that is disengaged from human rights standards both internationally and domestically. If the Council can couple its examination of procedural and technical issues with genuinely substantive questions of this nature, then the review process will yield fruit. If not, the Council will continue to offer little to people in countries like Myanmar, who lack avenues to address violations of their human rights not for want of the language of rights, but for want of a normative framework in which rights can be realized.

http://www.ammado.com/nonprofit/108433/articles/21575


Tuesday, March 1, 2011

B urma Karen petition urges UN to take action against junta

Karen petition urges UN to take action against junta

Monday, 28 February 2011 17:43 Ko Wild  

Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – A petition signed by 84,000 Karen has been sent to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to take action against the Burmese junta’s violation of human rights and military campaigns against the Karen people. 

Organized by the Karen National Union (KNU) and 31 Karen social organizations in 16 countries in Asia, Europe and North America, the petition was also sent to leaders of eight countries including British Prime Minister David Cameron and Australia’s Prime Minister Julia Gillard, according to the KNU. 

The eldest petitioner was 103 years old and the youngest was 16. 

Naw Zipporrah Sein, the KNU secretary-general, said, ‘We want Mr. Ban Ki-moon to use his power and authority to exert pressure on the junta to stop the violations of human rights. We would like to request Mr. Ban Ki-moon to put pressures on the junta to negotiate a cease-fire across the country, to hold a serious political dialogue and to build a federal country that can guarantee racial equality and human rights’.

KNU officials said that more than 3,600 villages in Karen State have been destroyed by the junta in the past 15 years. More recently, 18 Karen civilians were killed and 38 were physically abused by junta troops before the election in November 2010, officials said. It said 52 Karen were arrested unlawfully, 2,300 were used in forced labour, 198 buildings including homes, schools and churches were destroyed due to the military clashes in the Karen State, and more than 3,000 Karen villagers were forced to seek refuge in the jungle, according to the KNU statement.

During 2010, there were more than 1,000 clashes between the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the armed wing of the KNU, and junta troops in Thaton, Taungoo, Nyaunglebin, Myeik, Dawei, Papun, Kawkareik and Hpa-an districts, said KNU officials.

The KNU was formed in February 5, 1947, to fight for equality and self-determination for the Karen people.